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ABSTRACT
In today’s challenging business environment, organisations not only need to continue to leverage
their internal sources of competitive advantage but also should strive to harness synergies across
the multiple supply chains that they are part of. However, this has to be achieved through
effective collaboration between partner organisations. This paper contributes to the current
scholarly discourse on this topic by the application of the “Agency Theory” to the issues around
supply chain integration and collaboration, towards enhancing operational performance. The
paper presents a classification of supply chain integration and collaboration, as well as a
conceptual framework, for understanding and explaining the relational aspects of supply chain
collaboration, and links to performance.
Key words: Supply Chian Management, Agency Theory, Collaboration, Integration,
Performance.

Introduction:
The current business environment is often described as intensely competitive, increasingly
dynamic and globalised in. To remain competitive in such a challenging environment,
organisations should not only continue to leverage their internal sources of competitive
advantage but also should strive to tap into the synergies across the multiple supply chains that
they are part of. This means, competition occurs between collaborating enterprise networks
competing with each other; efficiencies are pursued through integration of business processes
across supply chains, and customer value is created and delivered in the form of product-service
packages, often, in partnership with multiple stakeholders in the supply network. However, such
a holistic approach to competition poses a raft of challenges for many organisations: for
example, dealing with disparities in commercial interests, investment priorities and risk

management; issues around resources and information sharing; managing change; protection of
intellectual property; lack of transparency, trust and commitment; opportunism; and much more.
In recent times, a range of “soft” aspects such as relationships, self interests, power and politics
and transparency have come to the forefront of scholarly discourses, as key factors underpinning
organisational performance and success. This paper contributes to the scholarly discourse by way
of examining the application of the “Agency Theory” approach, which deals with issues around
supply chain integration and collaboration, towards enhancing operational performance.
For the purpose of this paper, a “supply chain” is defined as a succession of (organisational)
entities involved in the creation and delivery of customer value, whether it is in the form of a
physical product, intangible service, or in some combination of the both. However, as
organisations often form part of more than one supply chain, they can be more meaningfully
interpreted to be part of a supply network or an enterprise network. Therefore, the terms ‘supply
chain’, ‘supply network’ and ‘enterprise network’ will be used rather interchangeably in this
paper, notwithstanding the subtle differences in their literal meaning. Supply chain “integration”
refers to the configuration of intra- and inter-organisational structures mainly, at the business
process level, in alignment with the overall strategic goals of partner entities. In effect, this
integration facilitates the swift and even flow of physical materials and products or services, in
addition to information, and the flow of funds through the supply chain. By comparison, supply
network “collaboration” is taken to represent the behavioural and soft aspects that drive,
facilitate, execute and control the above flow at all three levels of functioning: strategic, tactical
and operational. As such, this paper differentiates between integration (structural configuration)
and collaboration (commitment to relationships and cooperative efforts in sharing of resources,
knowhow, risks and revenue). Operational performance is defined in terms of commonly
accepted supply chain performance metrics, including the more traditional measures such as
cost, throughput and service level. “Agency Theory” attempts to conceptualise and explain the
relationship between the two parties indentified as ‘principle’ and ‘agent’, as applied to the
delegation of authority (control and decision making) within organisational contexts. The theory
is based on the notion of “agency problem” or the conflicting situation and subsequent behaviour
of the principal and the agent when their (self) interests and goals differ. Relationship issues such
as these are commonly cited in supply chain management literature.
Based on a comprehensive review of literature, this paper first proposes a classification of supply
chain integration and collaboration that distinguishes the relationship-oriented “collaboration”
from structural configuration-oriented “integration”. This classification, along with a synthesis of
literature on agency theory, is then used as the basis for developing a conceptual framework for
understanding and explaining the relational and behavioural aspects of supply chain
collaboration, and their relationship to performance. Some limitations of the agency theory
approach to supply chain collaboration and future research directions are also discussed.

Literature Review
Supply Chain Management
The contemporary discussion on competitiveness, by and large, revolves around the concept of
“customer value creation”. Extensive and sophisticated definitions and interpretations of the term
“customer value” can be found in marketing and business strategy literature [1-3]. Potential
customers evaluate alternative products and services that are available in the market based on
their “utility”. Utility as a value determinant reflects the benefits derived from consuming or
possessing a product or service, and could manifest in various attributes. For instance, they may
2

reflect functional value such as technical performance, aesthetic value such as physical features,
or social value such as brand image. A wider perspective of value may also imply other
intangible attributes of a product–service package such as friendly customer service,
convenience, availability, clean and attractive service settings and even social and
environmentally–friendly aspects. However, to be able to use the term utility meaningfully as a
measure of customer value, it should be expressed with reference to the price that a customer is
willing to pay for a certain product or service at a particular time, under a given set of
circumstances. This means that all of these value determinants may not be equally important to
every customer every time, when making a purchasing decision [4].
Organisations can enhance customer value by way of improving product or service performance
in terms of one or more of the key value determinants referred to above, reducing the cost of
delivering a certain level of performance, or some combination of both. In Porter’s [4] terms “ …
it [the organisation] must deliver greater value to customers or create comparable value at a
lower cost, or do both; … delivering greater value allows a company to charge higher average
unit prices, greater efficiency results in lower average unit costs” (p. 62). Porter’s [5] seminal
work on competitive advantage discussed in detail how the notion of “value chain” can be used
to organise a firm’s value adding activities so as to support a generic strategy.
Porter’s value chain framework has later been extended by some operations management
scholars in their advocacy for value network and supply chain approaches to managing business
operations across what they called “supply and demand chains” [6-8]. For instance, Rainbird [6]
noted that “value chain has its own frictions and interaction costs and the friction arises as the
core demand and supply processes interact and fuse” (p. 243). He further claimed, “while this
interaction will generate costs … it also is a potential source of dynamism and competitive
advantage” (p. 243). Walters [9] proposed that while supply chain management serves “the
functions of facilitator and as a means of differentiating a product offered, by adding generic or
specific elements of service” value chain management, which he claimed to be a broader concept
than supply chain management, “assumes the role of innovator, integrator and operations
coordinator” (p. 103).
Today, markets are becoming increasingly global, whereas customer requirements are getting
ever more sophisticated and rapidly changing. Customers’ knowledge of products and
technologies and their awareness of social and environmental issues are constantly improving.
Economic (and exchange rate) fluctuations, government regulations and societal pressure are the
forces that firms must learn to live with. Organisations are increasingly relying on technology as
a source of, as well as a vehicle for, achieving and sustaining competitive advantage. Mergers,
acquisitions and alliances of varying forms are all too familiar scenes in the corporate world. The
traditional organisational boundaries are becoming less meaningful when it comes to sustaining
competitiveness. Instead, new rules of competition are emerging based on such concepts as
extended enterprise, virtual organisations and value networks. These developments directly
impact on how business operations are managed within and across organisational boundaries.

Supply Chain Integration and Collaboration
There is growing recognition of the supply chain and value network approaches to managing
business operations. Many authors have called for viewing customer value creation in the
context of a network of organisations rather than within the boundaries of individual firms [10,
11]. The notion of focusing on the entire supply chain to deliver superior value rests on the
premise that:
3

•

virtually, any product (or service) is created and delivered through the collective and
coordinated efforts of multiple organisational entities in a supply chain; and

•

there are synergies to be gained at each stage of value addition across the supply chain, as
well as through synchronisation of internal and external supply chain processes (i.e. that
cannot be realised if each individual partner was to act on its own).

A supply chain approach to managing business operations, on the one hand, advocates the
alignment and integration of key business processes across the entire supply chain with particular
emphasis on efficiency, responsiveness and agility [9, 12-14]. On the other hand it emphasises
the importance of cooperation and collaboration between partners entities through such means
as: sharing of information, resources and risks; improved communication; and long-term
relationships based on transparency and trust. As such, “integration” and “collaboration” have
emerged as two major conceptual pillars of supply chain management research. However, the
intellectual argument remains that if a supply chain, functioning as a unified whole, exhibits the
above characteristics, it should essentially achieve the ideal goal of “swift and even flow” of
material, information and funds through the entire chain. A swift and even flow will, in turn,
ensure that the value determinants are met at the lowest possible overall cost, thereby offering a
superior value proposition to the customer.
The physical integration of supply chain processes can be facilitated, to varying degrees, for
example, by appropriate contractual arrangements (such as joint ventures, strategic alliances and
licensing) that lay out protocols for resources sharing, performance measurement and revenue
distribution between the supply chain partners.
However, a truly distinctive and comprehensive approach to managing supply chains can be
much more sophisticated and challenging than the interfacing of business processes and the
management of materials and information flows within and across organisational boundaries.
Because supply chains consist of a number of organisational entities that are operating based on
varying business models with unique capabilities, resources and organisational cultures, other
“soft” aspects such as relationships, trust and transparency become critical determinants of value
creation and delivery at the supply chain-level [15]. This may also mean, apart from
collaborating and coordinating the application of physical resources, supply chain partners
should appreciate the role of ethics, organisational values and social responsibilities as essential
ingredients for success within the context of supply chains [16-18]. Nonetheless, these noble
precepts have to be observed against a host of evil forces and commercial realities that are
inherent to the traditional entity of business: a desire to maximise returns at the individual
organisation–level; frenetic moves towards business consolidation; incompatible goals,
capabilities and infrastructure of individual organisations; and the need to protect commercially
sensitive information and/or proprietary knowledge, just to name a few.
As the first step towards developing a comprehensive framework for addressing these issues, this
paper presents an eclectic classification of the core attributes of supply chain integration and
collaboration, largely drawing on extant and seminal literature.
As shown in Figure 1 above, distinctions are made between integration vs. collaboration, internal
vs. external, data vs. process and informational vs. relational for the purpose of delineating the
relationship-oriented “collaboration” and structural configuration-oriented “integration”.
However, as per the scope of this paper, the emphasis remains on the relational and behavioural
aspects of collaboration between partners (external), as opposed to process and data integration.
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SC Integration and Collaboration

Configuration - Integration

Internal

Process

Business Processes
Functional
integration
[ERP platforms]

…

Cooperation - Collaboration

External

Data

Data Structures
[ERP platforms]

Data-bases; data
warehousing
…

Data

Information
Systems/Protocols
Proprietary vs.
shared data
Performance
metrics [SCOR]
…

External

Process

Informational

SC processes
SC infrastructure
Enterprise
Integration

Goal congruence
Joint planning
Decision
synchronisation
Communication and
information
exchange
Incentive alignment
Performance
evaluation

[ERP; EDI; Web-based…]

…

Internal

Relational

Commitment
Mutual trust
Risk sharing
Transparency
Accountability
Cooperation
×
×
×
×

Resources sharing
Information sharing
Knowledge sharing
Revenue sharing

Relational

Organisation culture
Leadership style
Internal control and
decision making
…

Informational

Delegation of
authority
Accounting and cost
control [ERP platforms]
…

Figure 1: An eclectic Classification of Supply Chain Integration and Collaboration
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Current Approaches to Supply Chain Integration and Collaboration
A number of researchers in the supply chain management area have proposed several alternative
and complementary theoretical lenses through which supply chain dynamics can be studied. For
instance, Halldorsson [11] have reviewed agency theory, transaction cost theory, network theory
and resource-based perspective towards the development of a mid-range theoretical base for
structuring and managing supply chains. Lavassani and Movahedi [19], after exploring the
merits of eight theoretical frameworks (namely: transaction cost theory; resource-based view;
knowledge-based view; strategic choice theory; agency theory; institutional theory; systems
theory; and network perspective) for studying supply chain management, proposed stakeholder
theory as a valuable complementary approach. Apart from the above literature that have reported
on broader approaches to supply chain management, a number of other authors have examined
how alternative theoretical frameworks can inform the various aspects (subsets) of supply chain
management such as risk management, quality management, outsourcing, information sharing
and corporate social responsibility [15, 20-22].
Supply chain integration and collaboration have also been examined in a similar vein,
particularly, informed by theoretical insights gained from other areas of organisational theory.
For example, Cao and colleagues [10] reported that supply chain collaboration has been studied
from four perspectives: uncertainty reduction, transaction cost economics, resource based view,
and learning and knowledge. Other authors have looked at the application of approaches such as
stakeholder theory and theory of constraints to improve collaborative relationships in the supply
chain [23].
Notwithstanding the insights developed through previous studies, some authors have claimed
that there are no widely agreed definitions or conceptualisations of supply chain integration and
collaboration, and this lack of clarity and consensus is hindering the progress of supply chain
management research and practice [24, 25]. Positivist schools of thought have largely informed
many conceptual frameworks proposed in literature, and the research efforts have predominantly
focused on structural integration. While supply chain collaboration is sometimes interpreted as a
means of achieving this structural integration, in many cases, not only the terms integration and
collaboration are used interchangeably, but are also interpreted with terminology akin to
structural or information-oriented interfacing of supply chain processes [13, 24, 26]. As such,
there appears to be no widely accepted theoretical or conceptual foundation to inform supply
chain integration and collaboration efforts. Nonetheless, a few recent contributions, for example
of Cao and colleagues [10] and Simatupang and colleagues [23], have emphasised a more
encompassing view of collboration, incorporating the soft aspects such as goal congruence,
decision synchronisation and incentive alignment, in addition to the more traditional hard aspects
of resources and information sharing. The major issue, however, remains that the vast majority
of theoretical perspectives proposed in previous studies are not able to adequately address the
underpinning behavioural aspects such as relationships, trust, ethics and politics and power that
are so prevalent in the current supply chain environment.
In an attempt to redress some of these issues, in the following section, we presents an agency
theory-based framework for conceptualising and explaining supply chain integration and
collaboration with particular emphasis on such soft aspects as commitment, cooperation, trust
and supply chain partner attitude towards risk, discussed in the preceding section.

An Agency Theory Approach to Supply Chain Integration and Collaboration
The agency theory posits the relationship between the two parties identified as “principle” and
“agent”, where the term “principal” is used to describe the party that delegates the tasks or duties
to an “agent” who, typically, possesses specialised knowledge and skills [27, 28]. In effect,
agency theory attempts to address the problem of (lack of) “goal congruence” between the
principal and the agent resulting from the potential opportunistic, self-seeking behaviour of the
agent which is presumed to be in conflict with the “utility maximisation”-oriented interests of the
principal [29]. The problem is often characterised by: differences in attitudes towards risk;
divergence in decision-making preferences; bounded rationality; an information asymmetry [30,
31]. The frameworks offered by the proponents of agency theory to address this problem include:
governance structures that reduce information asymmetry and limit the self-seeking behaviour of
the agent; contractual arrangements and incentive schemes that improve goal congruence and
control of agent behaviour; and information mechanisms that improve transparency and
accountability [21, 27, 28, 32].
Some authors have claimed that the principle-agent relationship is “one of the most common and
oldest codified modes of social interaction” and that “examples of agency are universal” [33].
For instance, agency theory has been applied as a framework for conceptualising and explaining
the relationships between contracting parties in such diverse areas as corporate governance,
managerial economics, organisational design, labour market structure and ethics [28, 29, 34-36].
Supply chain partner relationships, as described by many authors in the discipline, closely
resemble the agency problem. For example, a number of authors have cited (amongst others)
goal conflict, assymentry of information and incentive misalignment as major causes of conflict
in supply chain relationships [10, 23, 37-39]. Despite the widely-cited universal applicability of
the agency problem and the similarities between the agency problem and buyer-supplier
relationships, applications of agency theory within the supply chain management domain have
been sparse and piecemeal [11, 19]. As referred to earlier in this paper, a limited number of
literature reports on studies that have used agency theory to examine such aspects as supply risk,
information sharing; outsourcing and deterioration of product/service quality across the supply
chain in a rather isolated fashion. Building on this knowledge, this paper examines how agency
theory perspectives can be more comprehensively applied to improve supply chain relationships.
Although the classical agency theory encapsulates the relationship between the principal and
agent within the context of delegation of authority, we support the view that “examples of
agency problem are universal”, and therefore, agency theory can be a useful analytical lens for
studying relational aspects of supply chain management. The traditional dyadic buyer-supplier
relationships in a supply chain closely resemble the agency problem. However, the complex
power dynamics played out in contemporary supply networks may make it quite difficult to
articulate multiple relationships in terms of a simple buyer-supplier dichotomy. For example, as
Griffiths and colleagues [16] have suggested, a more powerful large supplier can exercise control
(“channel power”) over a small distributor(s) leading to the situation where the supplier may
assume the role of principal. These issues are further explored in the following section.

The Proposed Conceptual Framework
The success of supply network relationships is widely attributed to commitment to relationships,
and cooperation between partners, towards enhancing overall supply chain performance [10, 16,
37]. These behavioural traits are influenced by a number of contextual factors such as
uncertainty, mutual distrust and disparate goals. For example, the more uncertainty partners can
sense in a supply network, the more risk-averse they could become, and this may, in turn, change
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their behaviour towards other partners – a partner’s flexibility in cooperating with other partners
is expected to reduce as a result [40]. It is widely agreed that uncertainty can be minimized
through improving the visibility of supply chain operations [41-44]. This means, for example, if
each partner can share with other partners’ information regarding demand forecasts, production
plans and capacity utilisation, the risk of potential stock outs or excess inventory can be
minimised. Christopher and Lee [41] argued that in addition to improving visibility, supply chain
confidence should be built through allowing supply chain partners to exercise shared control
over supply chain operations. On the one hand, lack of control in supply chain operations may
lead to a lack of direction and trust. On the other hand one dominant partner exercising control
over the rest of the supply chain can undermine spirit of cooperation and collaboration [16, 28,
32]. Aligning partner goals and incentives across the supply chain towards optimising overall
supply chain performance could contribute to minimising the impact of uneven distribution of
control. Another widely discussed behavioural aspect is establishing and nurturing trust across
the supply network [40, 45]. Lack of transparency in decision making across the supply network
can have a negative impact on mutual trust between partners, and combined with goal
incompatibility, this may lead to a lack of willingness to share resources, information and
knowhow among supply chain partners [45]. These aspects are depicted in Figure 2 below and
further discussed using agency theory perspectives, in the remainder of this section.

Figure 2: Conceptual Framework for Supply Chain Integration and Collaboration
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The proponents of agency theory have advocated controlling risk and encouraging cooperative
behaviour between the principal and the agent through such means as reducing information
asymmetry and alignment of incentives. For instance, Eisenhardt [35] identified two key features
of organisations recognised in agency models: “the divergence of preferences among
organisational members”; and “outcome uncertainty” (p. 137). The notion of divergence of
preferences or “effort aversion” is closely related to the issue of “goal conflict” cited in supply
chain management literature, whereas uncertainty is viewed as a major challenge in managing
supply chain risks. Eisenhardt [35] further noted that there are two interrelated control strategies
to address this issue (namely, performance evaluation and appropriate recruitment and selection
approaches), and argued that “the role of control is to provide measures and rewards such that
agents pursuing their own self-interest will also pursue the collective interest” (p. 137). This type
of reconciliatory approaches may equally apply to supply chain collaboration through such
means as joint planning, integrated policies and decision synchronisation, as advocated in supply
chain management literature. However, as some authors [16, 28, 32] have argued, channel power
can be detrimental to supply chain collaboration, if not discharged through positive leadership.
Exclusivity of control in a supply network can breed lack of trust in partner relationships. It can
also limit the pace of the development of the network to the rate of development of the dominant
partner [16]. An alternative, and perhaps more effective, approach to addressing the issue of goal
conflict in a supply network is promoting collaboration between agents through improving
communication and coordination and adopting common operational protocols such as demand
forecasting and pricing models [46, 47].
Risk, from an agency theory perspective, can be attributed to the uncertainty associated with the
key supply chain decisions such as partner selection (the risk that the partners may misinterpret
their abilities and claim outcomes that they cannot deliver), or the risk of the moral hazard of a
partner making decisions that does not best serve other partners [27, 29, 48]. Risk in the supply
chain can also stem from information asymmetry and inability to monitor performance [27, 33,
49]. Faisal and colleagues [50] argued that sharing of information and improving visibility in the
network can reduce both uncertainty and goal conflict among partners. Information sharing
minimises risk, and if partners know what is happening in other parts of the supply network,
there is less chance of unexpected detrimental events occurring. The reduced possibility of
unexpected detrimental occurrences can provide agents with a sense of security and trust.
Improved information sharing, monitoring the progress and actions of other agents, and closer
relationships reduce the risk of moral hazard (lack of supplier effort) and adverse selection
(inaccurate assessment of supplier abilities), as claimed in agency theory literature [27, 51].
Agency theory literature concerning ethics and social responsibility has also emphasised the
significance of mutual trust in business relationships [18]. Trust or “confidence in each other’s
voluntary contribution” in business relationships is often claimed to have a positive association
with improved communication and information exchange [40, 45]. By comparison, lack of
transparency in decision making processes and poor communication and information sharing,
particularly when there is goal conflict (either deliberate or by default), can breed mutual distrust
and loss of confidence in supply chain relationships, leading to politically motivated behaviour.
If supply chain management is based on a relationship arrangement between multiple parties to
achieve some agreed-upon, common benefit, and pursue that goal through cooperative efforts,
agency theory approaches can facilitate this relational arrangement by addressing the issues
discussed above. Harmonised efforts of the partners, in a physically integrated supply chain will
result in higher efficiency, better throughput and improved customer service.
Additionally, flexibility and agency cost can be used to measure the improvements in supply
chain relationships. Flexibility is expected to increase through reducing risk and adopting an

information-sharing business culture in the network, whereas agency cost is expected to
significantly drop through improving collaboration and trust. A comparison between flexibility
and agency cost prior to- and after change in a supply chain and applying this framework to
relationships between chains’ agents closes the feedback loop [52]. A positive change in either
one or both metrics would be considered as an indication of success.
The conceptual framework in Figure 2 illustrates how the proposed improvement of performance
through collaboration can be achieved. In the multi-agent supply network, control, transparency
and visibility are the key issues to be managed. They directly affect the cooperative efforts
between agents and the principal, and, if deteriorated, they will drive the agents relationships to
becoming an agency relationship. These factors (Visibility, Transparency, and Control) can be
managed through mitigating risk, building trust between agents and aligning goals. If those
factors are managed, the expected benefit will be an improved overall performance.

Summary and Conclusions
An increasing proportion of value creation takes place outside the boundaries of individual
organisations[53, 54][53, 54]. This induces complexity and diversity into management decisions
regarding the structuring of the operations, the positioning of activities and processes, the role
and power of participants, and the most effective forms of collaboration between partners in a
supply network. The paper discussed, in some detail, various agency problem-equivalent issues
in supply networks, such as information asymmetry, conflicting objectives, differences in
attitudes to risk aversion, outcome uncertainty, behaviour based on self-interest, and bounded
rationality.
It argued that the current understanding of supply network dynamics is limited in that: existing
conceptualisations do not explicitly recognise the two perspectives of process-oriented
integration and relationship-oriented collaboration; and there is no comprehensive framework for
informing the relational and behavioural aspects of supply chain management. Based on an
extensive literature review, the paper presented an eclectic classification of supply chain
integration collaboration, explicitly recognising the aspects of integration at process and data
level, and collaboration with respect to information and relationships. The conceptual framework
developed, informed by the agency theory, captured the core informational and relational aspects
of supply chain collaboration and their link to supply chain performance. It was demonstrated
that an agency theory approach to supply chain management can enhance partners’ cooperative
efforts (in sharing of resources, knowhow, information, risk and revenue) and commitment to
their relationships, when the alignment of goals, mitigation of risks and building mutual trust can
be achieved through improved visibility and transparency, as well as shared control over supply
chain operations. This approach will in turn is expected to improve flexibility of supply chain
operations while reducing agency costs, thus leading to improved performance in terms of
operational efficiency, increased throughput and improved customer service.
Agency theory has been supported and followed by scholars for nearly eight decades. It has
served as a viable platform for understanding the negative effects of multiagency relationships in
supply networks. We believe that agency theory and majority of its researchers have so far failed
to address the positive, beneficial side of agency relationships in SCM. As such, we consider
investigating supply network aspects like risk, collaboration, and performance from an agency
theory perspective is a useful alternative approach that can bring about tangible benefits.
This conceptual framework should be verified and validated using industry-specific case studies.
Given, its limitations in addressing some behavioural aspects such as politics and power, and
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ethics and social responsibility, in future research, this framework should be extended to include
constructs representing the above aspects, preferably, from a social exchange theory perspective.
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